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• This is the first research brief in a three-part series that looks at Asia in the ageing 
century. This briefing sets the demographic context. With a focus on the countries of 
East and South-East Asia, it summarises past and projected trends and highlights the 
latest research in the area, including projects conducted by CEPAR researchers. 
 
• In total population terms Asia’s growth is expected to slow, but within 30 years it 
will still add one billion people to the world’s population. By then, East and South-
East Asia’s population growth will have stabilised. The more significant change will 
be the region’s age structure. Half of the extra one billion Asians by 2040 will be 
over 65. The ratio of the older (65+) to the working-age population (15-64) will 
more than triple in many countries of East and South-East Asia by 2050. China will 
by then have an older population than Australia or the United States. 
 
• Driving this demographic transition are increases in life expectancy and decreases 
in fertility, taking place at much lower levels of development than in the west. Life 
expectancy in China, for example, is a mere 3.5 years less than in the United States, 
even though income per capita in the US is ten times that of China.  
 
• The demographic dividend of large cohorts of young people was until now a boon to 
economic growth. There is now a window of opportunity of around a decade or so 
before the proportions of working-age populations across East and South-East Asia 
start to substantially decline. This means that now is the time to set up policies, 
institutions, and economic structures that will be favourable in the later stages of 
demographic shift, before ageing becomes a headwind hindering economic growth. 
 
• Future growth will rely more heavily on that other dynamo of East Asian economic 
growth: higher productivity per worker as urbanisation drives farmers to factories, or, 
with slowing urbanisation, as technology and education raise the efficiency of existing 
urban (and rural) workers. Even as China’s urbanisation growth slows, India and China 
are expected to add half a billion to Asia’s urban population in the next 20 years. 
 
• In addition to these trends, the brief discusses social trends and how ageing, 
urbanisation, and the changing social fabric are eroding traditional support systems. 
 
• In parts II and III of the series, the discussion covers two areas of economic activity 
of particular importance to the demographic transition: the means of providing 
retirement income on the one hand and healthcare on the other.  
 
• The overall message is clear. The Asian century will also be the ageing century – an 
important concept to grasp for countries, institutions, and individuals wishing to 
understand their place in its future. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the next thirty years an additional one billion people will call Asia home. But 
an expansion in the size of Asia’s population and its burgeoning economies is 
taking place in step with dramatic demographic changes to its age structure, 
urban-rural distribution, and social norms.  
 
Different parts of Asia are at different stages of demographic shift. Most of the 
population growth will be in South Asia, which is also younger and still has 
much more urbanisation ahead of it. East and South-East Asia is expected to 
contribute around a quarter of the extra one billion Asians by 2040, after which 
point its population is expected to start declining.  
 
Japan, for instance, has reached the future first, with an older population 
unparalleled in human history and one that will continue ageing and result in a 
shrinking population. Other nations, such as China, are still young but ageing 
faster than many advanced economies, including Australia and the United States. 
Recently, China’s Vice Premier publicly said that the scale and speed of the 
ageing population has exceeded expectations and that “China has not 
adequately prepared to respond to the ageing population” (Government of 
People’s Republic of China, 2012). 
 
This is the first research brief in a three-part series that looks at ageing in Asia. 
The series focuses on countries in East and South-East Asia, but with contrasting 
comparisons to key regional countries such as India and Australia. This brief sets 
the demographic context. It makes use of the latest data on past and projected 
population, urbanisation and social trends and summarises research in the area, 
including highlights of work being conducted by CEPAR researchers. Population 
projections are based on UN estimates, using 2010 as the base year. 
 
In parts II and III of the series, the discussion covers two areas of economic 
activity of particular importance to the demographic transition: the means of 
providing retirement income on the one hand and healthcare on the other.  
 
2. Total population 
 
Asia is home to over four billion people and makes up 60 per cent of the world’s 
population. It has contained the majority of the world’s population for a long 
time. Its share of the world population was 63 per cent in 1750 (Biraben, 1980). 
 
UN estimates suggest that one billion of the predicted 2.1 billion increase in the 
world’s population by 2040 will be in Asia. Figure 1 shows this increase through 
to 2050 across various world regions. While there will be 1.16 billion more 
people in Asia by 2050, on a par with the expected increase in Africa, the 
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increase in other regions will be more modest. For example, Europe’s population 
will increase by a mere 20 million. 
 
Nonetheless, population growth is slowing in all regions, particularly in East 
Asia. Indeed, East and South-East Asia will contribute around 240 million to the 
extra one billion Asians by 2040 but then its population is expected to start 
declining. An inflection point in population trends took place in the mid 1990s, 
both in the Asian continent’s population and in the population of the world. 
Average annual population growth on the continent was approximately 3 per 
cent in the past 50 years but is expected to average 0.6 per cent over the next 50. 
 
To a large extent these numbers are driven by what happens in China and India, 
which together are home to 2.6 billion people at present. While China’s 
population is expected to stabilise at 1.4 billion by 2050, India is expected to add 
half a billion to its current population of 1.2 billion.  
 
Naturally a region of this size is extremely diverse. We know for instance, that the 
population of Japan is estimated to decline by about 10 million by mid-century. 
 
Figure 1. Total population trends 
 
Source: UN (2011a) 
 
3. Age structure of the population 
 
Asia is growing decidedly older. Half of the extra one billion Asians by 2040 
will be over 65. The continent’s median age is moving from around 30 now to a 
predicted 41 in 2050. But the average hides considerable variation. Japan is the 
world’s oldest country with a median age of 45, which is expected to increase to 
52 by 2050. On the other hand, Timor-Leste is one of the world’s youngest 
countries by the same measure: the median age is 17, which is expected to 
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increase to just 25 by 2050. For context, Australia’s median age is currently 37, 
and this is expected to rise to 42 by 2050.  
 
An important way to measure the age structure of the population is to look at the 
age-dependency ratio: the number of those traditionally in retirement (age 65 
and above) as a proportion of those who are of traditional working-age (15-64).  
 
By mid-century, Asia as a whole will achieve an age structure similar to that of 
today’s more developed regions. In Figure 2.A, countries from East, South-East 
Asia and South Asia are divided into three groups according to the timing, level 
and speed of their ageing. 
 
Figure 2. Population ageing and its drivers 
 
 
 
Source: UN (2011a). Note: Stated percentages in Panel A denote expected level in 2050. UN data groups Taiwan 
under ‘Other non-specified areas’, where dependency ratio increases from approx. 15% in 2010 to 67% in 2050. 
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2050, these countries will have a higher level of age-dependency than the overall 
level in Europe, which is expected to double to reach a level of 47 per cent. 
 
At the other extreme are a number of countries with much younger populations 
that, despite some ageing, will have an age-dependency ratio that is broadly at or 
below Australia’s current level of 21 per cent in 2050. These countries include 
India, the Philippines and Pakistan. 
 
In between are countries that, although still relatively young, will achieve a level 
of age-dependency similar to that expected for Australia (39%) and the USA 
(35%) in 2050. These include several countries in South-East Asia as well as 
China, which is expected to have a dependency ratio of 42 per cent in 2050.  
 
4. Drivers of population ageing 
 
The rise in longevity, as a result of higher material wellbeing, advances in medicine 
and improved access to health services, has been the main driver of the initial stage 
of demographic transition to an older population (Preston, 2975; Figure 2.B).  
 
For example, key markers of China’s demographic transition were visible in the 
1970s when, by the end of the Mao era, it was able to achieve relatively high 
levels of good health at what was still a low per capita income. Life expectancy 
increased from around 45 years in 1950 to 74 years now – levels that developed 
countries took a century to reach and a change that has been described as the 
“most rapid sustained increase [in life expectancy] in documented global 
history” (Eggleston and Fuchs, 2012). The Chinese now have a life expectancy 
only 3.5 years less than that of the United States even though they have one 
tenth of the income per capita (UN, 2011a; World Bank 2013). 
 
In most cases, the next stage of the transition involved a fall in birth rates. This 
has been the result of a combination of factors acting to different degrees in 
different countries, including access to contraception, higher 
wages, urbanisation, a reduction in subsistence agriculture, and changes in 
values and social norms such as parental investment in the education of children, 
the status and education of women, and the availability of private and public 
support to allow women to combine work and raising a family (See Box 1).  
 
In the early 1950s fertility rates in both Australia and Japan were the same at 3 
births per woman. By the mid 1980s, Japan’s fertility rate had dropped below the 
replacement rate of 2.1 and has languished at a low level ever since. Hong Kong, 
Korea, Japan, Macao, Singapore and Taiwan currently have among the lowest 
birth rates in the world at between 1 to 1.4 children per woman, and well below 
those seen in other advanced economies.  
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By contrast, countries in southern Asia currently have some of the highest 
fertility rates on the continent, though these too have declined from past highs. 
For example, India’s fertility rate declined from six children per woman in the 
1950s to 2.5 in the period 2010-2015. China, with its strict population policies 
and rapid socio-economic development, saw the same level of decline over the 
15 years to 1980 as India has over the last 60 years. Precipitous drops in fertility 
to levels below replacement have repercussions several decades later, driving 
declines in the labour force, increasing the speed of population ageing, and, if 
sustained over several generations, can result in the shrinking of the population.  
 
Box 1. CEPAR research spotlight: Fertility in East Asia 
 
Developed East Asia shares the characteristic of very low fertility with Southern 
European and German-speaking countries. By contrast, fertility is relatively high 
(1.7 to 2.1 births per woman) in Nordic, English, French, and Dutch speaking 
countries. So what are the explanations for such a definitive cultural split?  
 
CEPAR’s Chief Investigator, Peter McDonald, has examined such questions in 
some detail (McDonald, 2008, 2009, 2011).  He notes that countries from different 
cultural spheres and of varying fertility levels have all experienced increased 
education levels and labour force opportunities for women. In all cases, this has 
resulted in women building up human capital and delaying first births. The key 
difference between the two sets of countries is that women in low-fertility countries 
have not been making up for the late start. Many end up having one child or none.  
 
The reason put forward relates to the support available to women to allow them 
to combine work with childbearing. The support can range from government 
policies to accommodating employers and community attitudes. In low fertility 
countries social institutions are such that care for children is the responsibility of 
families (primarily women) rather than of the state or employers. East Asian 
economies may have been able to adopt new economic models very quickly but 
they have been slow to adopt new social models. 
 
In shaping their responses policy makers in East Asian have looked to France and 
the Nordic countries. McDonald argues that looking to English-speaking countries 
with liberal economies similar to East Asia may yield greater success. There is no 
silver bullet, but policies should include “income support for families with children, 
affordable/quality child care and early childhood education, flexible working hours, 
parental leave, part-time work in one’s own job and reasonable working hours” 
(McDonald, 2008, p23). Importantly, reform to change social institutions must be 
supported by business groups, politicians and women’s groups. 
 
Indeed, in the absence of longevity increases or migration, a fertility rate of 1.4 
over two generations would mean that the cohort of grandchildren would be half 
the size of the cohort of grandparents and the population would practically 
disappear within ten generations. The UN projects that fertility rates in most 
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countries will tend toward just below 2 children per woman, but some countries 
have policies to increase fertility rates, such as Singapore’s ‘Marriage and 
Parenthood Package’ first implemented in 2001, which have met with with 
limited success (see Table 1 for summary and Box 1 for explanations). Others 
have low fertility rates as an objective. 
 
While there is diversity across Asia, there is also considerable sub-national 
variation in demographic trends. Rural and urban populations tend to have 
significantly different fertility rates and life expectancy. For example, in 2000, 
life expectancy in rural China was about 6 years less than in urban areas (Wang 
and Mason, 2008). Fertility rates in Shanghai are less than half of the national 
rate and these same populations are now ageing faster than other parts of the 
country. It is estimated that nearly a third of Shanghai’s residents will be aged 60 
and above by 2015 (SMPFPC, 2012). 
 
Table 1. Fertility policy in selected countries 
  
Fertility: children per 
woman (2010-2015) View on fertility (2009) Policy on  fertility (2009) 
Japan                                   1.4 Too low Raise 
Korea 1.4 Too low Raise 
Singapore                                1.4 Too low Raise 
Thailand                                 1.5 Satisfactory Maintain 
China                                   1.6 Satisfactory Maintain 
Vietnam                                 1.8 Too high Lower 
Australia                        1.9 Too low Raise 
Indonesia                                2.1 Too high Lower 
India                                    2.5 Too high Lower 
Laos 2.5 Too high Lower 
Malaysia                                 2.6 Satisfactory No intervention 
Philippines                             3.1 Satisfactory Lower 
Source: UN (2011a, 2011b). Note: Current rates may be different to these projections, which assume some convergence. 
 
5. Window of opportunity  
 
Increases in life expectancy and decreases in fertility have been associated with 
the rising levels of per capita output seen across Asia. The phenomenon has 
come to be known as the ‘demographic dividend’. Rising life expectancy means 
that a higher proportion of each cohort is living long enough to work. At the 
same time, decreasing fertility means a greater proportion of younger women 
can also participate in the labour market (Guinnane, 2011). 
 
The demographic dividend may have accounted for 15 per cent of China’s 
economic growth between 1982 and 2000 (Wang and Mason, 2008) and 
between one quarter to one third of the growth rates in the “East Asian miracle” 
(Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Lee et al., 2011; Golley and Tyers, 2012).  
 
It is important that countries take advantage of this concentration of working-age 
people before the population ages. It provides a window of opportunity to set up 
policies, institutions, and economic structures that will be favourable in the later 
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stages of demographic shift, when demography will result in a headwind 
hindering economic growth. 
 
The size and change of the working-age population as a proportion of the total 
population illustrates the scale and timing of the demographic dividend and the 
window of opportunity available to each society. Figure 3.A, presents this for 
countries grouped into three categories according to when the relative size of 
their working-age population reaches its peak.  
 
Most advanced economies, such as Australia and Japan, have already 
experienced their peak and are now seeing their working-age population 
decrease. So far, the fall in Australia is only relative to the rest of the population, 
but in Japan the fall is both relative and absolute. The declines have been 
softened by increasing numbers of women joining the labour force, however, so 
the ratios of employment to population have actually been increasing.  
 
A large number of Asian countries, including China and most of South-East 
Asia, are currently at the top of this hump and for them the window of 
opportunity to prepare for an older population will close within the next decade. 
Countries in South Asia will see that window closing within the two decades.  
 
For the middle group, the next decade will be critical. In an influential paper, 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) made estimates of GDP growth attributable to 
demographics between 1965 and 2025, predicting that demographic influences 
will reduce GDP growth by 0.14 to 0.44 percentage points in the second half of 
the period. This is something the Chinese government is acutely aware of and 
noted publicly when China first lowered its GDP growth target in 2012 to a seven-
year low of 7.5 per cent (Government of People’s Republic of China, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, countries in South Asia are projected to gain from their 
demographic changes. As their working-age populations grow they are expected 
to benefit from the onset of a demographic dividend. 
 
A key difference between advanced countries and the emerging Asian nations, 
and one that makes it all the more important to capitalise on the demographic 
dividend, is that the speed of demographic transition in the latter means that 
many risk growing old before they become rich.  
 
In a novel way, Figure 3.B plots estimates of GDP per capita and the age-
dependency ratio for selected countries between 1980 and 2050. The GDP 
projections are based on estimates related to each country’s (Cobb-Douglas) 
production function, which accounts for changes in capital and in the labour-
force, augmented to include changes to human capital (PWC, 2011). The chart 
shows that many East and South-East Asian countries will reach a much older 
age structure at a given level of GDP per capita than has been or is likely to be 
the case in countries such as Australia and the US. 
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Of course there are many factors that will influence the rate of economic growth. 
For example, levels of participation are important and one challenge will be to 
reduce the growth-slowing effect of an increasing burden of chronic disease 
relating to high-fat and calorie-rich diets, reduced physical activity, and elevated 
levels of smoking among males. Some also point to the ‘second demographic 
dividend’ as one where the old, through longer, healthier, and more productive 
lives, will benefit society more than was previously expected. 
 
Figure 3. Window of opportunity 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; PWC (2011); World Bank (2013); UN (2011a). Note: Black dots represent 2012 position. 
 
6. Urbanisation & migration 
 
The other big demographic change – also a driver of GDP growth – has been the 
rapid increase in urbanisation. Many East and South-East Asian countries, 
particularly China, have been able to take advantage of greater amounts of labour 
moving from farms to factories, which act as a motor for their industrial revolutions. 
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Past and projected trajectories are presented in Figure 4. Advanced countries, 
and some emerging economies such as Malaysia, already have high levels of 
urbanisation. China, which has urbanised very rapidly and currently has just over 
50% of its population living in cities, is expected to continue the transition from 
a rural to an urban society for some time to come. As this process slows, China 
could encourage rural migration by restructuring its system of household 
registration. India is urbanising at a more gradual rate – it is projected to hit 50% 
urbanisation in the 2040s. Given the size of Asia, the percentages translate to 
extremely large numbers of people. India and China are expected to add 
approximately half a billion to Asia’s urban population in the next 20 years. 
 
The two demographic shifts described above are not unrelated. Urban centres 
not only boast higher incomes; they also allow greater access to health services, 
education, and social networks – factors known to be associated with longer 
lives (Quinn, 2008). In advanced countries, about 80% of older people already 
live in urban areas. By 2050, approximately a quarter of urban populations in 
less developed countries are expected to be over 60 (UNFPA, 2007).  
 
Figure 4. Urbanisation 
 
Source: UN (2012) 
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Labour migration in the region has grown six per cent annually but flows are likely 
to intensify over the next decade as demand for skilled workers increases and the 
average East and South-East Asian worker is endowed with more years in education 
and professional expertise. The ILO (2011, p113) believes that “with ageing 
populations and shrinking workforces, Asia’s high-growth economies will compete 
for home-grown talent – which may increasingly opt for higher paid jobs and better 
working conditions in Europe and the United States”. Inter-regional regulations in 
ASEAN are already easing labour migration frictions.  
 
Australia and New Zealand are examples of countries with extensive experience 
of migration policy, particularly relating to skilled migration, which has also 
allowed them to temper population ageing. This option may be less desirable 
given the population densities of some Asian countries and unlikely to be 
effective given the scale of Asia, where migrants will also be older on average.  
 
7. Social changes  
 
The demographic shifts have been accompanied by a number of social trends 
with profound implications. For example, among educated women, there has 
been a greater inclination to prioritise career development and independence 
over marriage. Many are delaying marriage or not marrying at all. Also, their 
investment in education and higher salaries increase the opportunity cost of 
withdrawing from the labour force to rear children. This, in turn, compounds 
issues related to low fertility.  
 
Figure 5.A shows trends in the proportion of 35-39 year old women who have never 
married. In 1970, 6 per cent of this age group in Japan and Australia had never 
married. By 2005 the figures increased to 18 per cent and 22 per cent respectively. 
The reasons given often revolve around the relative disadvantage of marriage to 
women. For example women’s economic activity has increased but on average, 
Japanese women still spend 3.5 more hours of their day doing unpaid work 
compared to men. The average OECD gender difference is 2.5 hours (OECD 2011). 
 
In Australia lower rates of marriage have had a much smaller effect on fertility: 
34% of births are to unmarried women (ABS, 2010). But in Japan, having 
children outside of marriage is less culturally acceptable: only 2% of births are 
to unmarried mothers. The result is fewer children overall. As shown in the 
chart, these types of trends have not affected China and India so far. But a 
different type of demographic issue relating to marriage arises in China. The 
unprecedented increase in the proportion of male to female births means that 
over 10% of men in cohorts born between 1980 and 2000 are expected to grow 
old without ever having married (Ebenstein and Sharygin, 2009). 
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A combination of independent unmarried living, fertility declines and high levels 
of internal migration has meant that families and households have been getting 
smaller across East and South-East Asia (Figure 5.B).  
 
Figure 5. Social trends accompanying demographic shift 
 
 
Source: Jones (2010); National Statistics Offices 
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has in Japan and Germany (Lee and Mason, 2011). 
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children and/or grandchildren (UN, 2005). Such cohabitation has complex 
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Box 2. CEPAR research spotlight: Interdependencies of cohabitation 
 
As society ages, parents may allocate more resources to older relatives at the cost 
of children in the household, particularly where social safety-nets are absent. 
 
CEPAR Associate Investigator, Elisabetta Magnani, with other colleagues 
(Magnani et al., 2012), looked at the impact of care-giving responsibilities on the 
educational outcomes of the household’s children in Indonesia.  
 
The results suggest that in some situations there is indeed a diversion of 
resources away from children that affects their school performance. This is the 
case where wages that adult children can earn are low compared to the cost of 
formal care. Children’s school performance also suffers where community norms 
assign bequest on the basis of care provided to the elderly, particularly where 
assets owned by the elderly are significant. It suggests that policies supporting 
care need to be sensitive to interactions between economic and cultural factors. 
 
CEPAR Research Fellow, Shiko Maruyama, has also looked at questions of 
cohabitation of elderly parents with their adult children. In Johar and Maruyama 
(2011) he investigated the drivers of cohabitation in Indonesia. The findings 
suggest that while parental needs are important, the decision to cohabit is 
influenced to a larger extent by the private gains and costs of adult children. In 
fact, it appears that cohabitation is more likely among healthy parents with 
greater wealth. The results challenge the perception that elderly parents can rely 
on their children even in a society with traditionally strong family support.  
 
Maruyama’s more recent work (Maruyama, 2012; Johar and Maruyama, 
forthcoming) has tracked cohabiting families in Japan and Indonesia over time to 
find that there is a negative impact of cohabitation on parental health. Taking 
account of issues related to sample selection and causality, the results suggest 
that the survival rate of cohabiting elderly parents in Japan and Indonesia would 
be 1.7 and 2.7 percentage points per annum higher if they lived independently. 
Interestingly, this is not the case for parents who are socially active. The papers 
argue that cohabitation could worsen parental health because living with their 
children may mean that parents don’t invest enough in their own wellbeing.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This research brief considered demographic challenges relating to population, 
urbanisation, and social institutions in East and South-East Asia. Above all, the 
final stages of the demographic transition will define this as the ageing century 
as well as the Asian century. Responses will require the introduction of new and 
strengthening of existing policy, institutions and economic structures. Parts II 
and III of this series discuss actions falling under two broad topic areas: the 
provision of retirement income and of healthcare ■  
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